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THE SEARCH FOR ROUTES TO
BETTER ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE
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E
conomic performance is multi-faceted.Produc-
tivity and unemployment in a country are the
headline indicators of its economic performance.
They serve to summarize a variety of more basic
considerations. High productivity indicates that
wage rates are high in a wide range of jobs,so a wide
choice of careers is open to people,and that incomes
are high, so that people can afford the comforts, the
diet, and so forth needed to function well. A low
unemployment rate indicates that members of the
labor force can readily find vacancies in a wide
range of jobs, few employed people are quitting
their jobs out of dissatisfaction, and few jobs are
short-lived.
Labor force participation is an indicator in another
dimension of economic performance. Uniformly
high labor force participation rates are a sign that a
generally high value is being placed on existing jobs
and the wages they pay. In addition, participation
rates are an indicator of another dimension of eco-
nomic performance often called economic inclusion
– inclusion in the mainstream economy: For one
thing, they may reflect the extent to which main-
stream jobs provide people with economic indepen-
dence from the family and from the state.They may
also reflect the degree and breadth of the access to
mainstream jobs, thus indicating the country’s suc-
cess or failure in removing barriers to inclusion.
More needs to be said about the conception of eco-
nomic performance. As many philosophers have
argued, building on Aristotle, an economy cannot be
said to be well-performing if its participants are not
flourishing.And that deep kind of prosperity entails
that the available jobs are,on the whole,intellectual-
ly engaging and rewarding:That means a wide avail-
ability of work enlisting the minds of jobholders,
offering challenges in problem solving, leading them
to discover some of their talents and causing them to
expand their abilities. And from the discovery and
development of talents and capabilities comes what
is called personal growth.
Direct measurements of such discovery and devel-
opment are difficult, of course. It is reasonable, how-
ever, to suppose that an increase in such personal
growth (from one era to another or from one coun-
try to another) is signaled by an observable increase
in participation rates, reduced employee turnover
and thus reduced unemployment. So the degree of
prosperity in the above sense may be well proxied by
the level of business activity – the participation rate,
the unemployment rate and the activity rate.
The main national statistics on economic perfor-
mance, therefore, may be said to be normally indica-
tive of the underlying health of the economy they
describe – just as measurements of a patient’s
weight, blood pressure, etc. are normally indicative
of the patient’s health. But the statistics of a very
healthy economy may have statistics with some
“false positives” leading incautious observers to
believe that the economy is sick and in need of
reforms when it is merely suffering from bad exter-
nal shocks.And an unhealthy economy may at times
enjoy favorable winds giving it great-looking statis-
tics with “false negatives” that conceal its unhealthy
structure. So we must use the always interesting
“indicators” judiciously if we are not to be misled.
Thus,in comparing recent national statistics with the
glorious statistics in the 1960s, we must not jump to
the conclusion that western continental Europe had
well-performing economies then, relative to the rest
of the OECD, and now they are worse-performing.
Indeed, we believe (and have adduced evidence)
that some unusual market forces were almost cer-
tainly the main driver of the glorious statistics – not
a brief golden age of economic policies, economic
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tural influences.1 If so, it is the
inglorious years of the past ten
years or so, especially the mid-
1990s, when all the OECD
economies were more nearly in
a steady-growth state, that bet-
ter reveal the true relative
health of the Continental econo-
mies, not the glorious years.
(Whether in fact the structure of
the western Continental econo-
mies has worsened on balance
and, if so, by how much is far
from clear.) 
Our question here is the following:If we are not mis-
taken, a great many Europeans sense that the eco-
nomic performance of their economies as structured
at present could be greatly improved.We agree that,
in principle, their economic policies or economic
institutions or both could be changed for the better.
But which changes does actual evidence suggest
would deliver better performance? We distinguish
three points of view on the question, which we will
discuss in turn.
Does the neo-liberal/supply-side critique point the
way?
If a huge part of an advanced economy’s potential
performance is the stimulus and challenge presented
by jobs and the consequent discovery and develop-
ment of talents – a possibility requiring the economy
to be structured for well-aimed innovation – we
should be prepared to find much, and very likely
most, of the sources of high performance embedded
in the part of the economy’s structure that determines
the opportunities for problem-solving and personal
growth in the workplace – hence, in economic institu-
tions operating in the Continental countries and per-
haps even in their economic culture – and relatively
little in that part of the structure involving the cali-
bration of tax rates and benefit rates.
In contrast, neo-liberals and supply-siders put their
faith in reduced rates of tax and better tuning of var-
ious other policy parameter settings. Supply-siders
assert that ill-considered increases in the average tax
rate on personal income and in the social contribu-
tion levied on company payrolls are a major reason
for the elevation of unemployment rates and the
depression in participation rates.
Is there evidence that these policy settings are an
important cause of poor performance and their cor-
rection an important cure? The fact that tax rates
rose when – or before – unemployment rates rose on
the Continent is not persuasive, since a great many
other developments coincided with the rise in unem-
ployment.To obtain some estimate of the effect of a
tax rate increase or decrease on unemployment it is
natural to conduct a more demanding test: to ask
whether in the present era (or in an earlier one)
inter-country differences in unemployment rate
among the advanced economies of the OECD mem-
bers appear to be explained in part by inter-country
differences in, say, the total tax rate on labor.2
Figure 1 suggests that,within a considerable range at
any rate, an increase of the average tax rate has
rather little effect on unemployment. Even the very
high-tax economies of Denmark and Sweden do not
have relatively high unemployment and low partici-
pation. Neo-liberals may reply that many high-tax
countries happen to have some compensating condi-
tions avert high unemployment and low partici-
pation.
A further test is to ask whether inter-country differ-
ences in the increase of the tax rate on labor occur-




lower taxes on labor
may miss the 
essential points
Figure 1
1 Since industries on the Continent had done relatively little to
improve the techniques in use during the 1930s, when the United
States streaked ahead,and during the war and reconstruction in the
1940s, their opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s to adopt the
American methods made possible a period of phenomenal techni-
cal progress.
2The failure of some of the explanations critiqued here were noted
in Phelps and Zoega (1998).CESifo Forum 1/2004 5
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What matters is the
ratio of wealth –
social and private –
to after tax wage
rates
ring between some early time span after the war and
a more recent span are strongly correlated with
inter-country differences in the increase of unem-
ployment and the decrease in participation.
Figure 2 suggests that, within the historical range,
decadal changes in countries’ average tax rate have
little or no explanatory power in accounting for the
decadal changes in their unemployment and partic-
ipation rates. And some of the small effect that
appears in the charts may be temporary, not per-
manent.3
Such findings do not establish that tax rates do not
matter at all. We firmly believe, speaking for our-
selves, that increases in tax rates on wage income in
particular, such as payrolls, have temporary effects
on the medium-term natural unemployment rate –
the rate toward which the equilibrium unemploy-
ment will be approaching over some near-term
span, barring new shocks (Phelps 1994).4 But we
also believe that, if the pace of wealth accumulation
decreases in response to reduced after-tax pay (as in
all but so-called Ricardian models), the decline of
private wealth onto a lower path will tend to erase
much of the short-run effect.
The reason is that what matters
for the amount of labor supplied
and for employee loyalty – quit-
ting, shirking, and other be-
havior determining the amount
of unemployment – is not the
absolute wage but the wage as a
ratio of the workers’ wage to
their accumulated wealth (or
the cash flow from it). The exis-
tence of a permanent effect thus
depends on a failure of wealth
to fall ultimately in proportion
to after-tax wage rates.5 This
failure is likely, since wealth
includes social wealth – the present discounted
value of the entitlements provided by social legisla-
tion – as well as private wealth; and there is no rea-
son why social wealth should fall at all merely
because a tax increase has driven down private
wealth. In fact, recent decades have seen tax rates
increased for the express purpose of increasing
social wealth; where the unemployment rate rose
following the legislation, the tax increase was
blamed when, in truth, the increase in social wealth
was responsible.
In view of our theoretical strictures above, it will not
be surprising to learn that the tax rate used above
does little better in explaining differences in produc-
tivity either.
Another policy parameter that has been the focus
of the neo-liberals is the “replacement ratio”,giving
the proportion of the wage earnings that will be
replaced with benefits if a wage earner loses his job.
In theory, an employee who can expect a high
replacement ratio has a diminished stake in his
employment: he may invest less in his job and may
shirk his duties and quit more readily as a result
(Summers 1988). Others have emphasized the
incentives of the unemployed (Nickell and Layard
1999). Wage replacement delays and weakens the
job loser’s willingness to accept a new job and to
search for one – the more so the higher is the
replacement ratio.
Figure 2
3 There is no significant relationship (the correlation is 0.14)
between the two variables when Spain is omitted from the figure.
Its inclusion creates the appearance of a relationship (correlation is
0.39). Whether to infer that tax hikes might be to blame for a sig-
nificant part of the durable increases in the OECD unemployment
problem then hinges on whether Spain’s unemployment increase
can be attributed to increased taxes. Time series data show that
taxes in Spain rose continuously and smoothly from 1960 into the
1990s while unemployment rose rather abruptly after 1975,peaking
in 1985. Thus we would not agree that Figure 2 supports supply-
siders ascribing the increases in relative unemployment in some
countries to increases in those same countries’ relative tax burden.
A convincing analysis will have to be detailed and sophisticated.
4 Incidentally, the charts here pick up some of the temporary effect
of tax rates, since, until recently, most OECD countries kept on
increasing their tax rates, thus continually giving an upward jolt to
unemployment.So some of the already very small effect of tax rate
increases on unemployment depicted in the charts is not a perma-
nent effect; the latter is even smaller than the charts suggest.
5 In theory,the average tax rate on wages would be entirely neutral
in the long run, in theory at in any rate, if the legislature were to
keep workers’ social wealth in fixed proportion to their after-tax
wage rates.Then private wealth and total wealth would ultimately
decrease so as to regain their former ratio to after-tax wage rates
and in so doing restore the medium-term natural unemployment
rate to its previous level.However,Figure 3 does not show a significant corre-
lation across OECD nations between the replace-
ment ratio and unemployment in the mid-1990s.6
Figure 4 finds no apparent relation between the
increases from the 1960s to the 1990s in the decadal
replacement ratio and the increases in the replace-
ment ratio.
We ought to consider whether the influence of taxes
and replacement rates is present but masked by
omission of other possibly important variables hav-
ing influences.Nickell (2003) and various co-authors
have sought to explain differences in OECD unem-
ployment with a package of hypothesized variables
alongside taxes, the replacement ratio and its dura-
tion.That package did a good job of fitting the inter-
country differences in unemployment of the 1970s
and 1980s. Nevertheless, it did not do a good job of
fitting the differences of the 1990s nor the 1960s.As
we see it, the former two decades yielded favorable
results because the early years in both those decades
saw an explosion of job losses; and replacement
benefits (both level and duration) played a part in
determining how slowly the bulge of jobless persons
was digested into employment over the decade; in
contrast, the mid-1990s and the mid-1960s look
more nearly like a steady-state situation.
Furthermore, the movements of the package over
the decades do not generally explain why unem-
ployment rose in many countries between the 1970s
and the 1980s and fell in some countries between
the 1980s and the 1990s.7
Research in the supply-side spir-
it has been expanded in the last
decade to include the dial-set-
tings of numerous other “policy
variables” appearing in neoclas-
sical models – variables not the-
oretically doomed to have little
permanent effect. We might
mention here our own work esti-
mating the effect of our social
wealth (or social income) vari-
able upon one dimension of eco-
nomic performance, namely the
unemployment rate (Phelps and
Zoega 1997). It can be reason-
ably said that the estimated
effects on economic perfor-
mance measures of these further supply-side forces –
social wealth, public expenditure (i.e., government
purchases), private-sector capital stock, public capi-
tal stock, corporate profits tax rate and so forth –
have been disappointingly small, even if sometimes
statistically significant.
If our conception of the advanced economies is one
centered not around consumption and leisure but
instead around the attractions and rewards of busi-
ness life – problem-solving, the discovery and devel-
opment of talents, and the achievements that may
result – then it is not surprising that these policy
parameters, though important in the neoclassical
perspective generally adopted by supply-side ana-
lysts, do not make much of a dent on unemployment
and participation – as long as they stay in the histor-
ical range. It becomes hard to see why the neoclassi-
cal preoccupations with work-leisure substitution
should be center-stage. Reducing the calibrations of
the welfare state or cutting government purchases or
adding to capital stocks will not make jobs far more
engaging and rewarding,hence make participation in
the labor force far more attractive and unemploy-
ment far smaller.Only modest results can be reason-
ably hoped for. That may be why the plan of the
European Commission to add to the Continent’s
stock of bridges and tunnels struck many as a sort of
joke,even if they could not put their finger on why it
was funny. It appears unlikely that more bridges and
tunnels on the Continent will contribute measurably
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The size of unem-
ployment benefits
and their duration
also fail the test
Figure 3 Figure 4
6 Again, Spain is an outlier and has both high unemployment as
well as a high value of the replacement ratio. But in this case its
inclusion is not enough to raise a question about the inference to
make from the chart.
7 Using differences, as in Figures 2 and 4 above, we estimated an
equation where changes in unemployment for 14 OECD countries
were a function of changes in the tax rate, replacement ratio, the
duration of benefits,and so forth.When estimated this way,most of
the coefficients have counterintuitive signs and many are statisti-







to the sense of prosperity that
those countries are so acutely
and visibly missing. If that is so,
they will probably have negligi-
ble impact on participation and
unemployment. And it is doubt-
ful they will be productive
enough to repay their capital
cost.
The importance of economic
institutions for dynamism
The thesis has been advanced
that what may be called eco-
nomic dynamism – innovative-
ness coupled with a financial
sector capable enough to choose reasonably well the
innovations, firms and investments to support – is a
force that powerfully lifts economic performance in
all its main dimensions: participation, joblessness
and productivity.8 Though not itself a dimension of
performance, this dynamism is the fuel, the energy,
on which stimulation and problem-solving in busi-
ness, thus prosperity, and well-directed innovation,
thus relative productivity, feed.
There is circumstantial evidence that dynamism is
hugely important for the performance. It is plausible
to assume that a high value placed on the equity
shares traded on the stock market is a sign of high
dynamism in the business sector. Dynamism either
drives share prices to a higher level, since extant
firms represent a kind of option to exploit the valu-
able future opportunities that a dynamic economy
fosters, or it causes an increased
proportion of firms to list their
shares on the organized stock
exchange. It therefore strongly
supports our thesis that, among
11 large OECD nations, differ-
ences in the level of market cap-
italization taken as a ratio to
GDP – even the level many
years prior to the year of the
measured performance – have
considerable power to explain
differences in productivity, in
participation and in unemploy-
ment.9 See Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8.Two of these corre-
lations have more explanatory power than all the
neoclassical variables put together. Readers used to
focusing on labor market features may be surprised.
Yet, so broad a concept as dynamism is bound to
encapsulate goods, capital and labor markets.10
What institutions appear to matter for inter-country
differences in performance? Presumably there are
some economic institutions the presence and high
development of which serve to encourage or facili-
tate dynamism. It is reasonable to hypothesize that
organized stock exchanges, company law, suitable
bankrupty provisions, and corporate governance
Figure 5
Figure 6
8 The thesis was introduced in Phelps and
Zoega (2001), developed further in
Phelps (2001), and expanded upon in
Phelps (2003b).
9 See the latter two charts in Phelps (2003a).
10 In Figure 8 we first adjust productivity for differences in the
employment-to-working-age population ratio.spurring corporate performance,and schools prepar-
ing the population for business life all foster
dynamism. General institutions such as the rule of
law and provision of enough personal and national
security to safeguard earning, saving and investing
are needed for any market economy, even market
socialism; but they are not sufficient to generate
dynamism.11 Presumably there are also economic
institutions whose presence and force obstruct or
impede dynamism. Corporatist institutions that
invest company employees, labor unions, communi-
ties and other interest groups with the veto power to
block or limit entrepreneurial ventures and shifts in
corporate operations may choke
off valuable innovations, damp-
en entrepreneurial spirits and
thus decrease dynamism. The
task is to identify the institutions
that foster dynamism and those
that obstruct it; and to investi-
gate their empirical contribution
to performance.
Research of ours a few years ago
implicated some institutions in
the failure of most European
economies to grasp the opportu-
nities of the internet revolution
of the late 1990s – bureaucratic
“red tape” and employment pro-
tection legislation were among
these – and the findings credited some institutions
with helping some of the other OECD economies
with seizing the new opportunities – a relatively high
proportion of the labor force with a university degree,
for example (Phelps and Zoega 2001).In more recent
research we have been looking at specific institutions
in the corporatist landscape to see whether some of
them are, statistically speaking, harmful for economic
performance. The explanatory variables are the
degree of employer- and union-coordination in the
industrial bargaining process, here weighted by the
extent to which wages are “covered” by union scales,
the penalty for employee dismissal provided in
employment protection legislation;12 also, the volume
of required licenses hindering or deterring the estab-
lishment of new firms and new projects, as measured
by the OECD index of “red tape”. Our highly tenta-
tive findings suggest that the
effects of these institutions are
harmful for market capitaliza-
tion, which is a strong sign that
they are harmful for economic
performance.
Is economic culture an impor-
tant primary cause?
Continental Europe has been
languishing more than two
decades since the shocks of the
late 1970s.Southeast Asia,China
and India now exhibit enormous
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Douglass C. North in arguing the near- unworkability of an econo-
my not supported by property rights and the influential research by
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energy and initiative, whatever support and impedi-
ments are brought by their economic institutions.
Some economists have speculated that differences in
economic culture, even among the advanced
economies of the OECD members, may play some
part in the inter-country differences in current-day
performance statistics.
Do elements of a distinctive economic culture on the
Continent somehow impede the generation of
dynamism and thus lessen its economic performance
in terms of participation, unemployment and pro-
ductivity? Europeans themselves have suggested
that there is. In some Continental countries there is
an expressed uneasiness about making money. As
Hans-Werner Sinn said to one of us, a German
would rather say that he inherited his wealth than
say that he had made his fortune. There is the prac-
tice on the Continent of shielding teenagers from
any sort of job experience or earning any money, so
that the business world must seem rather foreign to
them as they are growing up. Some observers have
suggested that European schooling drains children
there of some of their playfulness and creativity.
Some Belgian businessmen were heard to say that
they thought Europeans were more risk-averse than
Americans. It has been said that the protection of
European culture has effectively meant sheltering
older and more established figures from competi-
tion, which may cause competing and upsetting the
established order to be viewed as wrong. (None of
these speculations implies that Europeans are defi-
cient in some sort of genetic material. Americans,
too, are largely of European stock.)
Critics say that these seeming deficiencies are not
causes – they are effects of ill-chosen institutions.
Yet, what are the causes of the institutions if not the
prevailing political economy, on which culture may
have much influence.
Conclusions and a side-issue
We agreed with the Europeans who sense that the
performance characteristics of the Continental
economies as currently structured leave room for
improvement. We went on to argue that the most
effective means to improvement do not appear to be
those in the neoclassical liturgy:smaller welfare enti-
tlements, reduced public expenditure, and so forth.
The conclusion to which we have been tending is
that the Continent’s performance will be markedly
better if it will nourish and promote (more than it is
already doing) entrepreneurial and financial institu-
tions that encourage and facilitate dynamism and if
it will remove or reform the institutions that obstruct
entrepreneurial activity and well-chosen financing.
Of course, identifying with ade-
quate confidence the many con-
crete institutions that are helpful
and those that are harmful is a
daunting task, yet some first
steps can already be seen as war-
ranted on the evidence.
But how – choosing our time
period of observation carefully
to avoid years or decades of
Table 1
Market Capitalization Ratio and Economic Performance
Dependent variables
















R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.60
Notes: Market capitalization is the value of shares in the corporate sector as a fraction of GDP in 1988 (Morgan
Stanley International). Labor productivity is calculated as business output per employed worker in US dollars. All
dependent variables are 1996 values. t-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 2
Economic Institutions and Dynamism












R-squared 0.73 Observations 19
Notes: Union coordination and employment protection are taken from
Nickell (2003) and represent averages for the period 1988–1995. University
degrees show the proportion of the labor force that has completed university
for the same period. t-statistics in parenthesis.unusual market forces – does Continental perfor-
mance generally rate gauged against the perfor-
mance measures of the US economy? Is Continental
performance already relatively good? Is it inferior in
some respects and superior in others? Or what?
In Table 3 we show some estimated measures of eco-
nomic performance in its various aspects for the three
large Continental nations – Germany, France and
Italy, the so-called “big 3”–  and the United States in
the steady mid-1990s.13 One of the table’s columns
quantifies the familiar fact that the unemployment
rate is considerably higher among the big 3 than in the
United States.These 1996 data do not differ marked-
ly from the rates in late 2003 and early 2004.
Another column addresses the belief that women
choose not to work on the Continent but men,having
as much aspiration for self-realization as American
men, have the same participation rate as  American
men. The data shows that, to the contrary, even the
participation rate of men is lower in the big 3.
Another column addresses the vexatious issue of rel-
ative productivity on the Continent.The productivity
estimates shown are those from a careful study by
Solow and Bailey (2001) using 1992 company data
from McKinsey & Company.These estimates suggest
that, contrary to widespread belief in Europe, even
hourly productivity in the big 3 is significantly below
that in the United States.Their measurements of out-
put per unit of capital in Europe relative to the
United States were even lower. In the ten years since
that study the productivity gap has widened, most
strongly since 1997. According to some experts on
productivity data, the gap would be markedly greater
if an adjustment were made for the workers of low
capabilities who are allowed to work in the American
business sector but who are barred from such jobs in
Europe by labor regulations, minimum wage laws.14
Moreover, in both France and Italy the wage rate gap
is worse than the productivity gap, since workers
there receive a compressed share of their productivi-
ty. As a result, the French and Italian average hourly
wage in terms of goods produced is more depressed
relative to the United States than is productivity.(The
reverse appears to be true in Germany.It may be that
business output in Germany is more composed of
high-wage engineering goods than in other countries.)
If these estimates are to be believed, the perfor-
mance of the Continent’s big 3 economies does not
compare favorably in any respect to those for the
United States.
This finding, to the extent the many Continental
economies conform to it, fits into the theme of this
report. The finding suggests that the Europeans are
right who say that there is much room for improving
the performance characteristics of the Continental
economies. The Continent’s relative productivity
performance is not a plus; certainly it does not
redeem the poor performance on the other mea-
sures. Furthermore, the finding that the Continental
economies tend to perform less well on all measures
(and in any case not better on some) adds support to
our belief, argued here, that the high joblessness in
the Continental economies – most notably, the large
ones – is just one manifestation of a systemic pathol-
ogy harming economic performance in all its dimen-
sions:Work is central to life and the quality of work
is a telling sign of the health of the economy’s struc-
ture. The active-age population can flourish only
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economies is 
inferior to US 
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business output in %
Men in labor force in %
of work.-age men
Employment in % of
labor force
US 100 49.5 87 94.6
France 92 42.3 75 88.1
Germany 92 52.4 82 91.3
Italy – 46.9 74 88.5
Market output per hour worked is for 1992 (Solow/Bailey): wage share is calculated for year 2003 (OECD); and men
in labor force and employment are measured in 1996 (OECD).
13 As commented above, the mid-1990s were not severely and dif-
ferentially disturbed by unique shocks such as the Continent’s
strides toward technical catch-up in the glorious years and the
extraordinary investment boom that gripped the United States and
left the big 3 on the Continent relatively untouched.
14 It is not true, incidentally, that the Solow-Baily calculations have
already adjusted for inter-country differences in the extent to
which businesses in some countries use far more “less qualified”
labor than do others. These results for France are discussed in a








with change, excitement and challenges in the work-
place. Underdevelopment of the institutions encour-
aging and disciplining entrepreneurs and their
financiers leads ultimately to diminished stimulation
at work and lessened personal
growth on the job,which are sig-
naled by lower participation
rates and higher unemployment.
Artificial barriers to entrepre-
neurship and thus to innovation
lengthen the technological lag
behind best-practice levels in
the world and thus to relatively
low levels of productivity.
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